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Abstract 
The Government of Uganda established external agencies as part of the control mechanisms 
aimed at promoting accountability in the public sector in general and local governments 
(LGs) in particular. The two cardinal control agencies include the Office of the Auditor 
General (OAG) and the Inspectorate of Government (IG), who are mandated to enhance 
public service through efficient and effective resource management, ensuring adherence to 
standards and regulations, and promoting responsiveness to community needs. In spite of 
these institutional controls, a surge of unbearable events involving abuse of authority and 
misuse of public resources still exists, suggesting significant managerial and capacity 
handicaps, not only in the internal mechanisms of LGs, but also in the external control 
agencies.  
This paper presents findings of a study conducted to evaluate the institutional capacity of the 
OAG and the IG in the enhancement of accountability in local governments (LGs) in 
Uganda. The findings demonstrate deficiencies in institutional capacity across the spectrum 
of financial, human and material resources, as well as the enabling legislation and lack 
stakeholder support. The scenario is a recipe for encouraging public malfeasance. The 
paper makes a strong case for strengthening institutional capacity, through improvements in 
planning, resource facilitation and collaborative relations among the key stakeholders. It is 
argued that the establishment of a special anti-corruption court could help reduce the delays 
and provide appropriate corrective measures in support of accountability. 
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Introduction 
The competences and commitment of external agencies that are expected to serve as 
vanguards of public sector accountability have been repeatedly questioned, amid continued 
reports of local governments’ mismanagement and poor service delivery in Uganda. While 
the reports continue to highlight weaknesses in internal controls, the external agencies of the 
Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and the Inspectorate of Government (IG) are, in 
principle, expected progressively to strengthen the internal mechanisms. In the wake of 
continued blame on the internal mechanisms of LGs, it becomes necessary to “audit the 
auditors” by undertaking institutional analysis of the external agencies’ capacity to execute 
their mandates. 
The performance of any organisation or agency largely depends on the magnitude of the 
responsibility/tasks before it and the strength of its institutional capacity. The institutional 
capacity elements include organisational structural arrangements, human and financial 
resources, enabling legislation, planning capabilities, and the support from the agency’s 
environment through its different stakeholders. Regarding the public institutional capabilities 
to enforce accountability, there is a need for any mandated agency to attain adequate 
numbers of qualified, motivated and facilitated human resources, and an enabling policy 
environment. Also of paramount importance also is the ability to undertake meticulous 
corporate planning, mobilisation of sufficient financial resources, and managing 
intergovernmental relations (collaboration) with stakeholders.  
The above aspects form the main themes of analysis in this article, upon which the capacity 
of the OAG and IG in enhancing accountability in Uganda’s local government sphere was 
evaluated. The discussion begins with conceptualisation of the notions of accountability and 
control as espoused in management (public management). This is followed by highlights of 
the structure and activities of the OAG and IG, before a substantial examination of the 
various capacity elements associated with the two institutions is done.  The paper draws on a 
series of key informant interviews in 2008 with senior staff from the OAG, IG, and district 
offices. 
Control and Accountability in Public Management 
Control is a critical management function, besides planning, organising and 
leading/directing. Control as a managerial function and activity seeks to protect against 
waste and deviation from planned activities and to ensure effective human and material 
resources utilisation. Control guides human and organisational behaviour towards achieving 
goals and objectives. While policy and plans may be perfect, this alone cannot guarantee 
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achievement of policy objectives. Control, thus, aptly feeds the requirements of 
accountability in the management of organisations.  
Control and accountability are critical in fostering public service provision, good governance 
and development. Accountability is the answerability for performance; or in the case of 
public sector realm, it is the obligation to expose, explain and justify actions taken on behalf 
of delivering services to the public (Basu, 1994). Accountability has become the cornerstone 
of public management because it constitutes the principle that informs the processes in which 
those who hold and exercise public authority can be held responsible or answerable for their 
actions or inactions (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000).  
The rationale for control and accountability in public administration and management has 
been reinforced by the ideals of good governance in which decentralised local governance is 
seen as a tool to promote democracy and development.  But because the local systems in 
Uganda, as elsewhere in the developing world, lacked capacity to monitor and probe the 
local bureaucracies, central government institutional mechanisms, including the IG and OAG 
were established to promote intergovernmental relations and nurture local capacity within 
the framework of decentralisation. The IG and OAG in Uganda, thus, form part of the 
monitoring and supervision tools in intergovernmental relations, in respect of the 
Constitution of Uganda (1995: Article 176), which enshrines democratic decentralisation and 
development.  
The ability to control and enhance accountability largely depends on the institutional 
capacity of an agency, which is derived from both the inherent/internal resources/systems 
and the support received from the external environment factors that can strengthen the 
internal processes in the achieving objectives. Thus, the capacity of the IG and OAG to 
control and enhance accountability in the context of this article – is viewed from two main 
perspectives. First is the resources at the disposal of these agencies, which facilitates or 
inhibits their capabilities to control (execute) the mandates. Second is the support from other 
agencies, exhibited in the intergovernmental relations, which has either strengthened the 
institutional capacity (through progressive and collaborative support) or has weakened the 
capacity to control by creating a dependency or by frustrating the efforts of the IG and OAG.  
The above insights are explored in the following sections of this article. It is, however, 
imperative to first look at the nature of the workload (mandate) and structure of the OAG 
and IG, which forms a basis for analysing the control systems and capacity profile for these 
agencies.  
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Structure and responsibility of the Office of Auditor-General (OAG) 
The OAG is charged with the cardinal duty of promoting accountability and good 
governance in public offices. In Uganda, the OAG is the supreme audit institution that is 
mandated to audit all public accounts and report to Parliament, to enable it to exercise its 
oversight role over the use of public resources (Constitution of Uganda, 1995: Art. 163 [3]). 
The OAG is required to conduct financial and value-for-money audits in respect of any 
income, or expenditure involving public funds, across all the spheres of government, 
including the local governments.  
The OAG is headed by the Auditor-General as Chief Executive, assisted by the Assistant 
Auditor-General and an Under Secretary. The office is composed of three directorates and 
two departments. The directorates include central government, local government and 
statutory/divestiture. The departments include finance and administration, value-for-money 
audit, and audit development and quality assurance. 
The Directorate of Local Government Audits was specifically established to supervise and 
coordinate the activities of various regional branches, which audit over 1000 accounts from 
different LGs. The OAG has established eight upcountry regional branches to ensure 
thorough and timely audit of all LGs including districts, municipal and town councils, and 
sub-counties.  
While the establishment of regional OAG branch offices is commendable, the eight regional 
offices were found to be too few to cover the whole country and effectively scrutinise 1060 
LGs’ accounts, comprising 163 districts and municipal authorities, 897 lower local 
governments (LLGs) in form of sub-counties and town councils. The Directorate of Local 
Audits is overwhelmed by the magnitude of local accounts, majority of which are not audited 
in the stipulated time required by law, due to shortages of staff and financial facilitation.20  
The workload schedule of the OAG is voluminous and overstretching their capacity 
(Table1).  
                                                          
20 Interview, Director Local Audits and Senior Principal Auditor , Office of the Auditor-General, 24th October 
2008 
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Table 1: Distribution of accounts handled by OAG during 2006/2007 
 
Audit Area/ Sphere Total Audited Work-in-progress/ 
Carried Forward 
Local Governments 1060 473 587 
Central Government 84 84 - 
Statutory Corporations 71 50 21 
Projects 99 98 1 
Total 1314 705 609 
Source: Office of the Auditor General, Policy Statement, 2007 
 
The table indicates an overwhelming number of LG accounts that were carried forward from 
the previous year (587). This suggests serious capacity shortfalls in human and financial 
resources and system drawbacks. These shortfalls will be explored later in the paper.  
Structure and responsibility of the Inspectorate of Government (IG) 
The IG is headed by the Inspector General of Government (IGG), deputised by the Deputy 
IGG and supported by the Secretary to the Inspectorate (at level of Permanent Secretary) as 
the Accounting Officer and the head of Finance and Administration Department. For 
coordination and systematic implementation of functions, the IG is structured into five 
directorates, headed by directors, and three units headed by senior inspectorate officers. The 
directorates include – Directorate of Operations (DOP), Directorate of Leadership Code 
(DLC), Directorate of Legal Affairs (DLA), Directorate of Regional Offices & Follow-up 
(DROFU) and Directorate of Education and Prevention of Corruption (DEP). 
The relevance of this structure is that, all the directorates in one way or another work on 
matters pertaining to accountability in LGs. The DROFU oversees and coordinates the 
activities of the 10 established regional offices, which deal with complaints from districts. 
The DEP occasionally engages LGs and civil society in sensitisation programmes to promote 
accountability, while the DLA leads in prosecuting cases of corruption and abuse of office.  
The IG functions and responsibilities are vast and stretch across the central and local 
government spheres. The IG is obliged to undertake measures to ensure the rule of law in 
public offices, accountability and integrity among public officials, and transparency in the 
exercise of administrative functions. The IG carries out investigations in instances where 
there is alleged corruption and abuse of office or authority, breach of the Leadership Code of 
Conduct by leaders specified under the Leadership Code Act (LGA), 2002, and where 
administrative injustice and maladministration are reported in public offices.   
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In the local government sphere, the IG is mandated to monitor the utilisation of Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PAF), probe suspected mismanagement of Universal Primary Education 
(UPE) funds, School Facility Grants (SFG), Primary Health Care, Water and Sanitation, 
Feeder Roads Maintenance, Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) and Local 
Government Development Programme (LGDP). Where corruption is found, the IG may 
prosecute or cause prosecution of culprits, or may undertake varying degrees of disciplinary 
action on mismanagement of PAF and UPE funds (IG-Report, 2007).  
An illustration on the cases before the IG during 2006/2007 reveals overwhelming workload, 
where 4500 complaints were brought forward from the previous year; and these were added 
on new complaints totalling 1972, making a total workload of 6472.  Of the total workload 
of 6472, only 1668 were concluded, leaving a balance of 4804 complaints for the period July 
2006 - June 2007. This is summarised in Table 2 below.  
Table 2: IG’s Workload for the July - December 2006 and January - June 2007 
 
 Jul. – Dec. 2006 Jan. – Jun. 2007 
Complaints Brought Forward (a) 2,265 2,235 
New Complaints Received (b) 875 1,097 
Total Workload (c) = a + b 3,140 3,332 
Investigated and Completed (d) 759 909 
Referred to other Institutions (e)  146 307 
Total Complaints Concluded (f) = d + e 905 1,216 
Carried Forward (g) = c - f 2,235 2,116 
Source: Adapted from: IG-Reports to Parliament – 2006 & 2007 
 
The above reveals that a large number of complaints are not concluded within the reporting 
period of six months, which suggests a higher workload and serious capacity deficits.  
The regional offices of the IG that handle cases from upcountry districts are also 
overwhelmed by the workload.  The figures in Table 3 below indicate the rising trend of 
cases received at the regional offices outside Kampala – the IG headquarters. 
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Table 3: Distribution of cases received by district/regional offices of the IG 
 
REGION July-Dec. 2006 % Jan.-June 2007 % 
Kampala  380 43% 450 41% 
Arua 46 5.3% 82 7.5% 
F/Portal 69 7.9% 88 8.0% 
Gulu 25 2.9% 60 5.5% 
Jinja 47 5.4% 57 5.2% 
Hoima 29 3.3% 30 2.7% 
Kabale 83 9.5% 119 10.8% 
Masaka 39 4.5% 67 6.1% 
Mbale 51 5.8% 40 3.6% 
Mbarara 71 8.1% 66 6.0% 
Soroti 35 4.0% 38 3.5% 
TOTAL 875 100% 1097 100% 
 Adapted from: IG-Reports to Parliament 2006 & 2007The table represents overwhelming  
 workload at regional offices that mostly handle LGs’ matters. 
 
Human Resources Capacity 
The high level of workload described above, points to the need for the IG and the OAG to 
have appropriate quantity and quality of human resources to execute statutory mandates. The 
increasing number of local authorities created as new districts in recent years has not been 
matched with the staffing levels at the regional offices. In a span of only two years, 2008 – 
2010, over 30 new districts have been created in Uganda by carving out and putting together 
sub-county territories of existing districts. It is observed that:  
The creation of new districts and many more lower local governments has 
placed a strain on the resources of the OAG to the point where the majority 
of audits in local government, especially at sub-county level are not audited 
and backlogs are growing.21  
The staffing situation of the OAG as represented in Table 4 shows deficiencies, with 73 
vacant positions in the various units. However, this number does not represent the actual 
staff shortfalls, as 394 is only a ceiling set by the Ministry of Public Service, which is far 
below the staffing levels required to deal with the magnitude of workload. 
Table 4: OAG’s staffing situation as at 30th June 2008 
Directorate/ Department Approved Filled Vacant 
AG’s office 4 4 0 
Central Government Accounts 88 78 10 
Local Government Accounts 145 136 9 
Statutory Authorities 50 39 11 
Value-for-Money Audit 20 7 13 
Finance & Administration 38 15 23 
Support Staff 49 42 7 
Total 394 321 73 
Source: Office of the Auditor-General 
 
                                                          
21 Interview, Director Local Audits Auditor-General’s office, 24th October 2008 
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One of the critical and highly technical units, Value-for-Money Audit, had only 7 vacancies 
filled, yet its work determines the real net-worth of service delivery in LGs, against the 
colossal sums often spent on local programmes including the PAF, PMA, UPE and LGDP. 
Insufficient staff numbers have led to a high officer/workload ratio, which explains the 
existing backlog of cases especially at the regional IG offices.22 
Other human resource capacity problems include: a high rate of employee turnover, 
especially in critical resource areas of lawyers, accountants, auditors and investigators, and 
poor pay that makes it difficult to attract and retain prosecutors in IG’s office, and thus 
amateurs often handle high stake cases and mess them up.  
The reiterations from district officials who were asked to evaluate the IG and OAG’s work, 
aptly describes the poor human resources situation of the IG and the OAG: 
There is a big problem with the IG’s staff turnover. These days they have very 
young and fresh graduates. In Iganga I had the experience of teaching them 
how local governments function, and yet these are the people supposed to 
monitor and evaluate what was going on.  I found them very “green” about 
many issues. I think the IG needs better qualified staff in accounting to probe 
financial accountability and engineers to make proper value for audit on 
buildings and roads.23 
 
You are coming to investigate a CAO and you send a junior officer. We have 
a team-leader for the OAG here; we have worked with her for sometime, but 
we were all surprised that she recently graduated from her first degree.24  
 
Nonetheless, there is some effort by the IG and the OAG to build capacity through training 
programmes in form of induction courses for new recruits, refresher training and skills 
development. The IG for example has benefited from skills training in surveillance and 
investigation techniques, transparency and fraud detection, combating corruption in the 
delivery of infrastructure services, leadership and change management, and result-oriented 
management. 
The problem though, is that many training programmes are often short-term and spin-offs 
from donor projects, and they rarely address the serious institutional human resources 
capacity needs. Yet, the donors often, and unilaterally so, withdraw or switch funding to 
other ‘priority’ areas, which makes capacity building rather, sporadic.  
 
                                                          
22 Interview, Deputy Inspector General of Government, 6th October 2008.  
23 Interview, Chief Administrative Officer Luwero District, 7th November 2008. 
24 Interview, Chief Finance Officer Luwero District, 7th November 2008 
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It is noteworthy, that despite the willingness on the part of many staff, especially in the 
middle -lower management levels to undertake training to boost their qualifications, the IG 
and the OAG do not offer funding for long-term training.25  Many employees from the OAG 
have undertaken professional/chartered courses and Master’s degrees, but have had to pay 
for themselves, sometimes having to hide from their bosses.26 This limits opportunity for 
skills development and employee motivation, which undermines institutional capacity to 
foster accountability.  
Finance and Material Facilitations 
The IG and OAG receive financial and technical assistance from the central government’s 
consolidated fund and development partners. For example, the implementation of the OAG 
Corporate Plan (2006-2011) receives donor support from the Irish Aid, Norway, ADB, and 
the World Bank. The OAG’s IT strategic plan receives support to introduce the new risk 
based financial audit methodology, along with the teammate audit management software, 
and several training programmes (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007). 
Despite financial support, the IG and the OAG continue to face several operational problems 
emanating from inadequate financial resources to handle the operational costs of 
investigations, prosecutions, verification of declarations, education and public awareness; 
and other aspects of the Corporate and Development Plan (CADP). Table 5 shows part of the 
funding variance in the IG totalling Shs 836,953,74427. 
Table 5: Variances and funding gaps in finance and administration of the IG-CADP (Shs) 
 
 Activity Corporate 
Plan Budget 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Budget  
Shortfall 
1 Recruitment of 10 staff to improve 
service delivery 
8,379,600 - 8,379,600 
2 Training 100 staff in various 
speciality/skills 
709,024,150 419,550,000 309,474,150 
3 Outsourcing of skills and services 3,154,593,994 2,652,534,000 502,059,994 
4 Facilitation of travel 138,792,000 121,752,000 17,040,000 
 Total   836,953,744 
   
Source: Inspectorate of Government Corporate and Development Plan (IG-CADP, 2004-2009) 
 
As earlier noted, the IG and the OAG have regional offices that continue to be overwhelmed 
by an increasing number of LGs in the wake of new districts creation. All these regional 
offices operate in rented premises, which do not only constrain the limited budget outlay, but 
also render it cost-ineffective in the long run. The regional offices were ill-equipped; having 
                                                          
25 Interview, Director IG-Regional offices and Follow-up, 6th October 2008 
26 Interview, Senior Principle Auditor, OAG 24th October 2008 
27 US$1=approximately Ugandan Shs 2,000 
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either an old vehicle or none, inadequate office equipment and poor records storage facilities. 
Table 6 demonstrates material shortfalls in one of the IG’s directorates, worth Shs186, 
600,000.  
Table 6: Logistical gaps in the IG’s Directorate of operations 
 
 Item Required Available Short-fall Cost of 
shortfall 
1. Double Cabin pick-
ups – 4 WD  
9 6 3 180,000,000 
2.  Video Cameras  2 0 2 3,000,000 
3.  Photo Cameras  4 0 4 800,000 
4.  Tape Recorders  6 2 4 800,000 
5.  TV Screens  2 0 2 2,000,000 
Total                                          186,600,000 
Source: Inspectorate of Government (IG-CADP, 2004-2009) 
 
Regarding the OAG, the agency proposed a total expenditure of Shs. 9,470,000,000/- for the 
financial year 2007/2008, which was viewed as a bare minimum to audit 1,314 institutions 
including: 84 central government ministries; 1,060 local governments; 71 State corporations; 
and 103 projects.  To train staff and carry out 30 audit inspections, only Shs.7,740,000,000/= 
was provided as per the ceiling set by the Finance Ministry (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007), 
creating a shortfall of Shs. 1,730,000,000/=. It was no surprise that the OAG was only able to 
complete 705 audits out of the overall total of 1,314 during 2006/2007 (as indicated in Table 
1).  
Records from the OAG indicate that staff salaries are not spared by the budgetary cuts from 
central government. While the OAG required Shs. 2,300,000,000 to pay salaries of 394 staff 
members, only Shs. 2,010,000,000 was provided by the Finance Ministry, leaving a funding 
deficit of Shs. 290,000,000 (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007).  
The OAG has not been able to audit the activities undertaken in districts relating to the use of 
poverty alleviation funds (PAF), to which it is mandated. The PAF was set up to provide one 
route of attaining the objectives of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). The 
Auditor-General acknowledged this in his policy statement (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007). 
Due to the large number of projects undertaken under PAF in all local 
governments, including Sub-counties, Town Councils, Municipalities, 
Districts and Central Government Ministries and Departments, the OAG has 
found it difficult to satisfactorily cover all the areas due to inadequate 
resources.  
An examination of how the investigation cases before the IG were handled during the 
periods July-December 2006 and January-June 2007 reveals serious capacity gaps.  
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Figure 1: Handling of cases by IG: July - December 2006 & January - June 2007 
 
Adapted from: IG-Reports to Parliament, 2006 and 2007 
 
Figure 1 shows that a large number of cases, 2,235 (71%) and 2,116 (64%) for periods July-
December 2006 and January-June 2007could not be concluded owing to capacity limitations, 
emanating from finance, human resources and collaboration inadequacies. Only 759 (24%) 
and 909 (27%) for the two periods, respectively, were investigated and concluded. Such 
backlogs and the related capacity deficiencies undermine accountability in LGs. 
Parent and Enabling Legislation 
Conventionally, all organisations are miniature replicas of the laws and regulations that 
create and maintain them. The legislative framework sets the jurisdictional rhythm of any 
organisation, in terms of functions, powers, privileges, relationships, and resource capacity. 
Thus, legislation becomes a major tool in analysing the institutional and functional capacity 
of any agency. 
The study identified good and elaborate pieces of enabling legislation available to the IG and 
OAG to foster accountability in LGs. These include: 
• The Constitution of Uganda, 1995;  
• The Inspectorate of Government Act (IGA), 2002;  
• The Public Finance and Accountability Act (PFAA), 2003;  
• The local Governments Act (LGA), 1997;  
• The Local Government Finance and Accounting Regulations, 1998;  
• The Leadership Code Act, 2002;  
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• The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Act (PPDAA), 2003;  
• The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1972 (as amended in 1989); and  
• The Public Service Standing Orders, 1988.  
The above pieces of legislation mirror the spirit of empowering the IG and OAG to execute 
their mandates. The law establishes the OAG as the supreme audit institution of Uganda with 
the responsibility to scrutinise, verify and report to Parliament on the propriety and regularity 
of the manner in which public funds are used. Likewise, the IG has powers to investigate or 
cause investigation of any offence or breach of public authority and may prosecute or cause 
prosecution of any such offenders to eliminate and foster the elimination of corruption, abuse 
of authority and of public office (Constitution of Uganda, 1995 (Art. 225[1]); IGA 2002 
(s.8). The law also seeks to protect the independence of the IG and OAG, as they are not 
supposed to be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority; but only 
responsible to Parliament (Constitution, 1995: Art. 227; IGA, 2002: s10) and (Constitution, 
1995: Art. 163[6]; PFAA, 2003: s33 [2]), respectively.  
Nonetheless, the challenge is in the operationalisation and observance of the law. 
Compliance with the law is important because, just like in the principles of exercising 
justice, "it must not only be said to be done, but must be seen to be done". Despite the array 
of legislation, the legal regime does not seem to offer an environment that helps in deterring 
offenders. According to the Deputy Inspector General of Government (IGG), “the law is 
apparently very lenient and it does not provide deterrent sentences to perpetrators of white-
collar crime that the Inspectorate prosecutes”.28  The law affords the magistrates a wide 
discretion to determine sentences and the option of a fine is often imposed. The convicted 
persons are thus made to pay small amounts of money as fines, which creates no deterrence 
to corruption.  
For example, in a court case (Uganda vs Balinda) where the accused, an agent of Kampala 
City Council (KCC) was contracted to collect rates he solicited and received a bribe of 
Shs 500,000/=, and was sentenced to one and a half years in prison or pay a fine of Shs 
30,000/= (approx. US$15). He paid the fine and walked home (IG-Report, 2007: 62). 
Another case (Uganda vs Tabaruka James) involving a public officer who was charged 
and convicted of corruption and abuse of office for soliciting and receiving a bribe of Shs 
2,000,000/=; the court sentenced him to either two years in prison or a fine of Shs. 300,000/= 
(U$150). He paid the fine and walked away (IG-Report, 2007: 62). Such weak consequences 
associated with poor sanctions and actions tend to condone misconduct. According to Pauw 
                                                          
28 Interview, Deputy Inspector General of Government, 6th October 2008. 
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et al. (2002: 339), when the “perpetrators of corruption believe that, even if their misdeeds 
were discovered, the repercussions would not be strong, they can commit unethical deeds 
with impunity”. 
Another problem in implementing the law concerns the interpretation of the powers of the 
IG, which have been variously challenged in the Constitutional and Supreme Courts.  In the 
case of Mohammed Kezaala (Jinja Town Mayor) vs. the IGG and others, Miscellaneous 
Application No. 28 of 2009, and another case involving Mukono District Chairman Engineer 
Mulondo. The court reinstated the duo who had been removed from office on orders of the 
IGG, on the account that the IGG contravened the principles of natural justice and 
overstepped her power jurisdiction.  The court decisions imply that, while the IG may have 
strong legislative capacity, its powers have to be exercised within the limits and caution on 
respecting the rights of local government agencies, and within the spirit of intergovernmental 
relations.    
Regarding the OAG, there has been a failure to comply with the law as auditing of LG 
accounts and presentation of reports has not been done within the statutory time of end 
October. Accounts of LLGs of 2003/2004 were not audited by end of the financial year 
2006/2007, three years after the statutory period, mainly because the OAG lacked adequate 
human resources and late disbursement of funds from central government (OAG-Policy 
Statement, 2007).  
Table 7 provides a summary of status of compliance by the accounting officers in submitting 
accounts to the various OAG regional branch offices. 
 
Table 7: Status on submission of accounts by accounting officers as at 31st October 2007 
 
 BRANCH NO OF LGs COMPLIANCE NON- COMPLIANT     
  NUMBER % NUMBER % 
Fort portal 20 15 75 5 25% 
Masaka 19 8 40 22 60% 
Mbarara 22 22 100 0 0 
Jinja 18 14 80 4 20% 
Mbale 20 10 50 10 50% 
Arua 17 - - - - 
Soroti  17 12 70 5 30% 
Gulu 12 11 98 1 2% 
Kampala 18 14 80 4 20% 
KCC 1 5(of 6) 90 1 10% 
TOTAL 164 111 68% 53 32% 
Source: Directorate of Audit (Local Government Accounts) OAG 
 
It is observed that accounting officers from HLGs who submitted accounts in compliance 
with the statutory time of 31st October 2007 were 111 (68%) out of 164. Accounts from 53 
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(32%) HLGs were not been submitted to the OAG for audit as per the statutory time of 31st 
of October. 
Support from Other Agencies/Stakeholders 
The success in the battle against the ills of public sector ineptness largely depends on 
collaboration and support from stakeholders at national and local levels.  The nature of the 
functions of the IG and the OAG prescribe that they must, inevitably, operate in liaison and 
support of other agencies and stakeholders.  The IG and the OAG need to collaborate with 
institutions like the Presidency, Parliament, Judiciary, Police Force, Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP), Criminal Investigations Department (DPP), local government 
authorities, and civil society.  
The leading support to the IG and the OAG is from international development partners, 
through financial and technical support. For example, the African Development Fund (ADF) 
provided a grant of 9 million Units of Account (UA 9,000,000) to finance the Institutional 
Support Project for Good Governance (ISPGG), which earmarks accountability and building 
institutional capacity to improve public service delivery through cross-cutting reforms in 
governance (OAG-Policy Statement, 2007). Other project support to the OAG include the 
Financial Management and Accountability Project (FINMAP 2005/06 – 2009/10) financed 
by DFID, the European Commission, IDA, the governments of Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and Japan. 
The major constraint faced by the IG and the OAG is that some institutions that are supposed 
to be partners in fostering accountability, delay or completely ignore the IG’s and the OAG’s 
recommendations. The IG is required by the Constitution of Uganda, 1995 (Art. 231) to 
submit to Parliament at least once in every six months, a report on its performance and make 
recommendations pertaining to performance of public institutions. The IG also forwards part 
of its report to local government authorities, where matters concern them. In principle, 
Parliament and such authorities are supposed to discuss these reports and implement the 
recommendations.  
However, Parliament and local authorities have not been enthusiastic enough on this. 
Parliament hardly discusses such reports, let alone following on the recommendations 
contained.29 The reason often given to the IG is that “Parliament is very busy and occupied 
by equally important business”.30  This rather lukewarm enthusiasm towards the IG and 
OAG reports on the part of the Parliament does not only serve to demoralise the effort of 
                                                          
29 Interview, Deputy Inspector General of Government, 6th October 2008 
30 Interview, DIGG, 6th October 2008  
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such watchdog institutions, but also squanders the opportunity to better public sector 
management.  The need to consider reports timely and exhaustively by the relevant 
authorities is underscored by Hanekom and Thornhill (1986: 115) who argue that “if the 
compilers of reports know that they are to be analysed in detail, they are often encouraged to 
provide a faithful review of their activities”, and the reverse is also true.  
The study revealed that, negative attitudes, corruption and intransigence in the institutions 
that are supposed to be partners in fighting graft frustrate the IG and the OAG. Some 
institutions/officials take unnecessarily long or just ignore to take action on queries raised by 
the IG and the OAG, against those implicated.31  The CID and DPP often fail to pursue a 
great number of criminal cases, even when the IG and OAG have preliminarily unearthed 
substantial evidence against offenders32.  
Figure 2: Progress of prosecution cases handled by the IG from July 2006 – June 2007* 
 
 
*Cases did not necessarily commence in this period. Each case might have more than one charge  
Adapted from: IG-Reports to Parliament, 2006 and 2007 
 
Deficiencies in institutional collaboration also arise in prosecution of court cases.  Court 
cases take a long time to be disposed offconcluded and this adversely affects prosecution, as 
witnesses get overtired, lose interest in cases, face intimidation, and some even die before 
ruling is delivered (IG-Report, 2007). Oftentimes, eExhibits are often lost from the courts 
                                                          
31 Interview, Director IG-Regional offices and Follow-up, 6th October 2008 
32 Interview, Deputy IGG and Director IG-Regional offices, 6th October 2008 
Convictions 
 
Total Cases Prosecuted 
 
Cases Still On-going in Court 
40 
Cases 
Dismissed 1 
Acquittals 
 
Cases awaiting 
Judgment 8 
Appeals 3 
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and witnesses may disappear. The delays also extend to the appellate process in the Court of 
Appeal. Records of proceedings from trial courts and judgment take long to be availed to the 
IG to formulate grounds of appeal and prosecute the appeals (IG-Report, 2007). The fFigure 
2 below illustrates the court dilemmas. 
Figure 2  shows that for more than a year , out of a total of 52 cases prosecuted by the IG, 
only 12 had been concluded (as convictions, dismissals or acquittals), and eight cases 
awaited judgment in the courts. A total of 40 cases were still on-going, suggesting 
deficiencies in offering support to the IG, from courts and other stakeholders. 
Jurisdictional Limitations 
Jurisdictional limitations provide another challenge. While the IG and the OAG can 
investigate, audit, query and pass verdict on the performance of any public entity, they often 
have no powers to overturn the results of poor administration and managerial malfeasance. 
Bernt and Owen (2000) argue that, even in highly acclaimed Western democracies like 
Canada, the provincial ombudsmen can only afford remedial recommendations, with 
relatively weak mechanisms to enforce them. At best, they can forward reports to higher 
authorities in government. This means that the enforcement of IG and OAG 
recommendations sometimes relies on the voluntary will of other governmental bodies, who 
may chose to ignore them, after all.   
Corporate Planning 
Contemporary management practice stresses the need for organisations periodically to 
examine their operating environment so as to respond timely and appropriately to the needs 
of the organisation and the clientele. With planning, the organisation exhibits the capacity to 
forecast and influence the course of future events for survival and sustainability. A corporate 
plan is also a performance instrument that takes stock of past experiences and builds upon 
them to aspire for better outcomes in the future. An elaborate, sound and viable corporate 
plan, thus, becomes a major indicator and tool in analysing the institutional capacity of an 
organisation. 
The IG and the OAG have engaged in corporate planning, which shows future prospects in 
their role of fostering accountability and effective public management. The study reviewed 
the OAG’s corporate plan 2006 – 2011, which earmarks, among other things to: undertake 
structural transformation; promote financial capacity; operational independence; improve 
monitoring processes and management information systems; HR retention; strengthen 
research, development and quality assurance. This effort demonstrates a proactive approach 
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to strategically improve the OAG institutional capacity and performance.  
However, the focus of the OAG’s corporate plan hardly took care of the need to promote 
collaborative relations with stakeholder agencies. Yet the need to streamline cooperation and 
relations with non-governmental organisations, private sector organisations and civil society 
is crucial to securing stakeholder support. For example, the private sector provides services 
to the public through contracting-out or through public-private partnerships. Private sector 
agencies are often culpable in conniving with public officials to flout tendering regulations 
and giving dismal services to the public. The NGOs also play a crucial role in monitoring 
and evaluating the quality of service delivery in LGs. Thus, failure to enlist them is a serious 
omission in planning. 
On the other hand, the IG’s Corporate and Development Plan (2004 – 2009) addressed 
important issues of future institutional capacity, including: restructuring and streamlining of 
IG operations and systems; undertaking needs assessment and developing HR; mobilising 
resources; expansion and strengthening IG regional presence; sensitisation and education; 
making periodic integrity surveys and system studies; enhancement of coordination and 
collaborations. 
The drawback to IG’s corporate plan, however, is that while it lays down core objectives, 
performance indicators and targets, it offers little detail on the specific activities and tasks to 
be undertaken, or their corresponding time-frames. It is apparent that the IG plan’s 
successful implementation heavily relies on outside partners and donors whose funding is 
often sporadic and may not be guaranteed. 
Nonetheless, the research noted that both Corporate Plans from the IG and the OAG link 
very well with the national development priorities as enshrined in the poverty sector-wide 
approach of the PEAP. The premising on the PEAP offers a vantage position in attracting 
partner support. 
Conclusion 
The institutional analysis demonstrates that the external control agencies of the IG and the 
OAG exhibit mixed fortunes of institutional capacity. Despite the continued donor support 
and the high expectations of better outcomes from the IG and the OAG in pursuit of 
enhanced accountability and effective public management, these agencies continue to be 
encumbered by a torrent of financial, human and material resources limitations, as well as 
deficiencies in the enabling legislation and support from various stakeholders. The 
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deficiencies cause a backlog of cases every year, which a recipe for encouraging public 
malfunction and a future threat to losing public confidence in these institutions. 
The battle against the ills of public sector ineptness requires stronger and committed 
collaboration and support from different stakeholders. This calls for improved support from 
Parliament, the CID, the DPP, local authorities and the courts of law to augment the IG’s and 
the OAG’s capacity. The delay to concluding court cases, which adversely affect the 
functioning of the IG, can hopefully be solved with the establishment of a special anti-
corruption court. Given the sophistication of the means to obscure fraud and corruption, the 
IG and the OAG staff must be equipped with advanced and specialised investigative training 
to keep ahead of fraudulent practices. The corporate plans of the IG and the OAG represent a 
well-thought desire and effort to foster accountability and effective public management, but 
they should rekindle a proactive approach to strategically build and rejuvenate collaborative 
relations with other stakeholder agencies to augment their institutional capacity.  
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